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RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORIIN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA. By Girardeau A. Spann. New
York: New York University Press. 1993. Pp. vii, 266. $40.
TIES

To engage in a serious discussion of race in America, we must begin
not with the problems of black people but with the flaws of American
society - flaws rooted in historic inequalities and longstanding cultural
stereotypes. 1

Professor Girardeau Spann of the Georgetown University Law
Center would probably characterize the Supreme Court's perpetual
subordination of minority interests as one of American society's key
"flaws." Spann raises serious and thoughtful questions about the present legal system's ability to achieve racial equality in the United States,
tracing the current lack of racial equality to the inherently
majoritarian Supreme Court.
Part One, entitled "Veiled Majoritarianism," describes the
Supreme Court's counterminoritarian propensity. In Chapters One
and Two, Spann debunks the Supreme Court's ability to behave according to the traditional model of judicial review, which postulates
that the Court can perform in a countermajoritarian manner (pp. 926). Here, Spann lays the historical framework for the notion of a
countermajoritarian Court. He concludes that the Court is in fact
counterminoritarian despite the traditional model and the safeguards
designed to check majoritarian tendencies (pp. 19-26). He reasons,
first, that the formal safeguards the Constitution articulates are ineffective. For example, Supreme Court Justices' life tenure and salary
protection, designed to isolate the Court from political pressure, are
inadequate for the task. Spann resolves that these formal safeguards
have only symbolic value because they have failed to shield the Court
from political pressure in the past and continue to perpetuate the judiciary's majoritarian disposition (pp. 23-25). Second, Spann challenges
the legal system's operational safeguards, including its dependence on
principled adjudication. This dependence fails to arrest the Court's
counterminoritarian tendencies because the judicial discretion inherent in the process of principled adjudication does not prevent the permeation of majoritarian values (p. 26).
Furthermore, Spann contends that Supreme Court Justices cannot
protect minority interests because they are indoctrinated with
majoritarian ideologies throughout the confirmation process. He argues that this indoctrination penetrates the Justices' ideologies in such
a way and to such an extent that they are unable to avoid complete
conversion to a majoritarian mentality (pp. 20-23). Moreover, these
1. CoRNEL Wrsr, RAcE MA.TIERS 3 (1993).
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Justices invoke majoritarian ideologies both consciously and unconsciously. Neither the formal nor the operational safeguards can
counteract the infiltration of internalized majoritarian values. First,
the formal safeguards cannot subvert the unconscious reliance upon
majoritarian ideologies (p. 25). Second, the procedural safeguards
necessarily involve a certain degree of judicial discretion; the Justices'
majoritarian inclinations affect their use of this discretion (p. 26). Justices use their discretion to derive legal principles, to decide which
legal principles to use, and to select among the outcomes various legal
principles will produce (p. 27). This discretion results in the influx of
majoritarian preferences.
Chapters Three, Four, and Five explore how judicial discretion enables the infiltration of majoritarian values into legal principles and
how this discretion continues to manifest those values through the selection and application of legal principles (pp. 27-82). Spann claims
that this discretion permits Justices to invoke majoritarian preferences.
Chapter Three argues that the Supreme Court both expressly and implicitly relies upon majoritarian preferences in applying its legal principles (p. 27). Expressly, the Court interprets legal principles to
comport with prevailing majoritarian philosophy (p. 27). When courts
interpret legal principles in a majoritarian manner, they cannot preserve minority considerations in judicial decisionmaking (p. 31). Implicitly, the Court gives effect to majoritarian preferences through
deferential standards of review (p. 31). To support his claim, Spann
discusses three methods the Court may employ to defer to
majoritarian values and cites several examples of the Court's approach
under each method. First, the Court may decline to apply heightened
scrutiny to specific cases even though they appear to be race cases (p.
32). Second, the Court may determine that challenged government
entities have in fact made the difficult showing that a heightened standard of review requires (p. 32). Third, the Court may decline to protect racial minorities from a classification that adversely affects their
interests by invoking justiciability problems to avoid reaching the merits of an equal protection claim (p. 33).
Even if the Court defines a legal principle in a manner favorable to
minorities, majoritarian preferences can become manifest when the
Court selects the appropriate principle. In Chapter Four, Spann argues that majoritarian preferences affect the selection of legal principles to resolve a disputed minority issue: "Selecting applicable
principles is an act of loosely constrained discretion that once again
creates opportunities for a judge's personal attitudes to enter into the
decisionmaking process" (p. 36). Judicial discretion is inevitable in
many instances, especially in cases of first impression, cases to which
more than one statute or principle may apply, and cases in which
characterization is necessary (pp. 36-57).
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Then, even if a legal principle is defined and selected appropriately,
the Court can apply it in a counterminoritarian manner. Spann's
Chapter Five suggests that the Court applies legal principles so generally that majoritarian-influenced judicial discretion reigns (pp. 58-60).
The Court often derives legal principles by sifting through the conflicting policies associated with implementing various principles. Thus,
Spann argues that the majoritarian Court selects the policy that best
accords with its majoritarian preferences to the detriment of minority
interests. Part One concludes by maintaining that the Supreme Court,
charged with protecting minority interests, is unable to do so (p. 81 ).
Moreover, the safeguards designed to dissuade majoritarian tendencies
actually perpetuate them in certain instances (p. 81).
Part Two, "Perpetuating Subordination," describes the "subtle"
ways the Supreme Court subordinates minority interests (p. 82).
Chapter Six posits that racial minorities can best achieve equality
through the political process; however, minorities tend to neglect politics because of their dependence on the Court (pp. 85-86). This dependence, Spann asserts, stems from the Court's "centralization" of the
means minorities can use to seek equal treatment and its "legitimization" of assumptions about minority legal status. First, although the
political process is clearly the mechanism for manufacturing
majoritarian ideology, Spann maintains that minorities achieve their
greatest successes in the political arena (pp. 85-86). Minorities participate more successfully in the political process because politics has no
rules and no right or wrong results (pp. 86-89). "The value of politics
... is that it escapes the need to depend upon principle for its proper
operation" (p. 87). Second, minorities have attained political clout in
part through majoritarian support that, according to Spann, stems
from minority voting strength, minority participation in voting coalitions, and the majority's need for self-confirmation of its sensitivity to
minority issues (pp. 91-93).
Still, the Supreme Court inevitably imposes majoritarian constructs on the political process (pp. 99-103). Although minority issues
can advance more purposefully in the political arena than elsewhere,
the Supreme Court responds slowly to these advancements, to the advantage of competing majoritarian interests (p. 103). In favoring
political advancements against minority interests, the Court has established a harmful relationship between itself and minority groups. This
harm is perpetrated through minority groups' dependence on the
Supreme Court for social and political gains, the centralization of
race-relations law in a manner that limits political gains, and the legitimization of self-perpetuating assumptions in the field of race-relations law that discourage the pursuit of racial equality.
In Chapter Seven, Spann argues that through Brown v. Board of
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Education 2 and similar allegedly countermajoritarian decisions, the
Supreme Court has lulled minorities into a sense of dependency on the
Court for racial equality: "[Brown] is better understood as a veiled
majoritarian effort to perpetuate minority subordination" (p. 104).
Brown supporters represented many ideological factions who desired
an end to segregation for personal gain but were not seeking minority
advancement (pp. 108-09). Although the Court relied primarily on
majoritarian interests in deciding Brown, its decision was perceived as
a victory for minority rights. As a result, Brown seduced minorities
into complacency by invalidating the separate-but-equal doctrine and
purportedly solving the inadequacies in black schools. According to
Spann, Brown's result - desegregation - has proven unworkable because most desegregated schools are predominately black and remain
inferior to white private and suburban schools. 3 Furthermore,
Brown's doctrine - separate-but-equal is unconstitutional - hurts
minority efforts for equality, especially in the educational arena, where
desegregation efforts have in many cases superseded the importance of
gaining a quality education, and in the affirmative action arena, where
the Court has used its prohibition of race-based classifications to eliminate many affirmative action programs created through the political
process.4 Finally, Brown's effect - minority dependency on the
Supreme Court for protection - is detrimental to minority interests as
a whole. Dependence on the Supreme Court distracts minorities from
the gains that they can achieve politically and reinforces minority subordination (p. 110).
The standards that the Supreme Court - as the centralized arbiter
of equal protection doctrine - imposes on affirmative action programs
have perpetuated majoritarian values aimed at stifling minority
achievement. Spann argues in Chapter Eight that modem racial discrimination is statistical and can be defeated only by allocating resources statistically (pp. 120-24). The Supreme Court, however,
defines the criteria according to which it judges discrimination in such
a way as to defeat enactments that allocate resources on a statistical
basis (p. 133-34). By applying a nondeferential standard - strict scru2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Pp. 111-14. Spann's argument is a compelling one. Indeed, desegregation probably was
not the most effective means to transform the facilities of separate black schools into their white
counterparts. However, Brown still retains some vitality in sparking countennajoritarian efforts.
Even though Brown, in practice, placed black children educationally worse off in a desegregated
system than in the previous segregated one, it arguably still served as one significant advance
against the perpetual inequality to which blacks were subject. For an insightful discussion of
Brown's effects, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE 102-22 (1987).
4. P. 109. "[NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel R. Jones] argued that segregation was itself the most important educational harm to be remedied because of its connection to institutional racism [and that] ... there was no constitutional right to a quality education but only to an
education that was not officially segregated." P. 114 (citing Nathaniel R. Jones, Correspondence:
School Desegregation, 86 YALE L.J. 378 (1976)).
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tiny - to affirmative action on the local government level, the
Supreme Court has effectively held that only federal affirmative action
plans are constitutional (p. 127). Minorities, however, can implement
affirmative action plans more easily on the local level, where there is a
concentration of minority interests (p. 134). The Court, in effect, has
limited minority affirmative action advancements. First, minorities
must secure increased political power to ensure the adoption of affirmative action legislation. Second, affirmative action, under the Supreme
Court's conception, relies upon the belief in a color-blind, neutral society when, in fact, all decisions must confront the race factor (pp. 13649).
Finally, the Supreme Court has legitimated three majoritarian assumptions about the legal nature of racial equality. Chapter Nine describes the traditional model of judicial review, which assumes that an
unassailable set of individual or substantive rights exist and are legitimate; that the Court can legitimately explain ambiguities inherent in
defining these rights; and that minorities cannot legitimately disturb
this rights structure (pp. 152-54). Through the technique of "distraction,"5 these assumptions repress minorities' perceptions of the
achievement of racial equality as well as inhibit the vigorous pursuit of
legitimate claims (p. 157). Minorities' adherence to the Court's legitimization of these assumptions continues to jeopardize their pursuit
of racial justice in America.
Spann's critique of the Supreme Court is both cogent and provocative, yet it suffers from several deficiencies that spoil his thesis's validity. First, Spann assumes a unitary majoritarian populace with
distinct preferences that are wholly counter to those espoused by minorities. Second, Spann develops his critique of the Court's judicial
conservatism by using notions of political conservatism. Third, Spann
fails to analyze critically the options minorities may face in the future,
and the options he does provide may be disastrous in operation.
Spann never fully constructs his notion of majoritarian philosophy.
His argument is only convincing to the extent that there exists a single
majority with one set of preferences that contradict minority gains.
But such a group does not exist. 6 The majority actually consists of
people from various cultural backgrounds.7 Though these people may
unite to fend off threats of minority gains, internal inconsistencies exist
5. Spann asserts that the legitimization process escapes detection through distraction. According to Spann, "[a]rguments always rest upon underlying assumptions. When one's analytical attention is focused on the intricacies of an argument, however, the underlying assumptions
on which the argument rests may completely escape scrutiny . . . . [Especially with controversial
topics, the] controversy itself serves to increase the level of distraction." P. 152.
6. Some theorists, however, do argue in favor of the existence of a silent majority. See, e.g.,
ALFRED W. HORTON, THE SILENT MAJORITY (1970).
7. I do not mean to suggest here that cultural heritages are the only distinguishing factor
among the majority. Other factors - including political, economic, and social interests - also
create divisions within the majority.
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within the group. 8 Many preferences differ from member to member;
moreover, some interests displayed by certain members of the majority
may parallel those of the minority group. 9 If no single set of
majoritarian values exists, then the Supreme Court cannot effectuate a
particular set of counterminoritarian principles that it attributes to
and assimilates from the majority. Although the Court may indeed
perpetuate minority subjugation, as Spann suggests, Spann's assumption of veiled majoritarianism cannot account for this phenomenon.
Another difficulty with Spann's argument is that he appears often
to view judicial conservatism and political conservatism as interchangeable ideas. Spann seems to narrow the type of majoritarianism
ideology the Court imposes to conservative majoritarianism: "The
Supreme Court can best be understood as a representative branch that
is politically sensitive to conservative majorities" (p. 103; emphasis
added). The Court's inherent judicial conservatism, however, does not
necessarily reflect political conservatism, as Spann seems to suggest.
The conservative ideology that Spann wants to attribute to majoritarianism, and inevitably to the Supreme Court, may not be inherent to
either. Majoritarianism may actually reflect some of the concepts of
liberalism, and traditionally, liberals have strongly advocated racial
justice. Although Spann does not necessarily espouse politically liberal views, he clearly despises politically conservative beliefs. 10 But if
Spann cannot define majoritarianism in terms of political conservatism, his argument against majoritarianism as perpetuating the subjugation of minorities remains questionable.
Spann closes his discussion with little hope and fewer solutions. 11
He asserts that the Court is replete with majoritarian preferences and
Congress is, by definition, majoritarian. Minorities can obtain only a
limited number of successes in Congress and even fewer in Court.
Although Spann gets us over some of the hurdles to understanding the
perpetuation of racial inequality - knowing who the competition is
and understanding its tactics - his analysis leaves only three possibili8. Indeed, even the individual members' perceptions of who constitutes a minority may differ;
for instance, whether people of Asian descent fit into the minority category is questionable to
some. Spann does concede that some may perceive his notion of the racial majority as monolithic. P. 5. He does little, however, to dispel that impression. Later, when Spann discusses the
dangers that the emerging minority neoconservatives present, he explicitly contradicts his idea of
a singular minority preference by recognizing the neoconservative threat within the black populace. Pp. 158-59. Other scholars have encouraged such diverse political views within the black
community. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 1, at 59.
9. Spann would probably dismiss divergent interests within the majoritarian group by stating
simply that the relevant preferences here are those the majority share that disadvantage the minority quest for racial equality. However, Spann's argument that antiminority interests exist is
weakened by his failure to articulate the scope of those interests.
10. For a glimpse of Spann's views of conservatives, see pp. 158-59. See also supra note 8.
11. "The terrifying truth that is legitimated by the Supreme Court's guarantee of
countermajoritarian judicial review is that the Court's protection of racial minority interests
appears to be perpetual. What an ingenious constitutional scheme." P. 160.
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ties for the fate of minorities, none of which seem promising. 12 Minorities can perish within the system, revolt, or continually struggle for
racial justice. 13 The first possibility has clearly dire consequences, not
only for minorities but also for the United States as a whole. The
second possibility - revolution - is also not promising. Given the
persistent mistrust many Americans display toward minorities, any
minority revolt is likely to be bloody and futile. Spann's majoritarian
government would guarantee this result: a government that perpetuates majoritarian values to subordinate minorities would of necessity
fear insurrection and prepare for it. With Spann's understanding of
majoritarianism, the third option - struggling for racial justice - appears doomed to failure. Minorities will have little incentive for any
struggle for racial justice unless they create some incentive fueled from
within their own communities.
Although Spann offers no tidy solution to the problem of a
majoritarian Supreme Court, by revealing dangers underlying the doctrine of the Court regarding minority gains he may stimulate thoughtful discussion of these issues. 14 Race relations in the United States are
definitely in need of a major overhaul. Theoretically, minorities have
by now learned some of the rules of the race, but something, no doubt,
is impeding their quest for equality. Spann's effort to deconstruct in a
meaningful way the majoritarianism of the Supreme Court aims and
succeeds respectably at uncovering some of the major hurdles to
achieving racial equality.
-

Melissa Nicholson Starkey

12. Spann's insights into resolution of the problems he presents reflect, to some extent, his
status as a critical legal studies scholar. Those who criticize critical legal studies describe it as a
quest for purpose with little result-based analysis. "Critical legal studies [does not contain] ... a
comprehensive announcement of what a credible and realizable new society and legal system
would look like." CoRNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH 196 (1993).
13. Another possibility Spann implicitly suggests is the "cultural commitment to independence and self-sufficiency" exemplified in the black nationalism and black power movements of
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Spann attributes these movements' decline to the rise of a
majoritarian "rhetoric of integrationism." P. 145.
14. Indeed, Spann does not stand alone in his skepticism of the Supreme Court's commitment to the protection of individual rights. See, e.g., DAVID KAIRYS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SUPREME COURT (1993).
[T)here must be safeguards: mechanisms and institutions that vigorously protect human
integrity, dignity, freedom, and equality, as well as a citizenry that is informed and conscious of history and the potential for tyranny among the best nations and peoples. This is
the inherent message of the Bill of Rights as well as the best social vision.
If we value and wish to guarantee these protections, the next question is the mechanism
for their implementation.... [I]t is important to recognize that conservatives have tended to
reject judicial protection while simultaneously rejecting protection implemented by any alternative mechanism. We have adopted, in a fundamental sense, the worst of combinations:
the courts now reject the role of protector of personal freedom, and the legislatures and
people still defer such matters to the courts.
Id. at 36-37.

